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JURISPRUDENCE DU TRAVAIL 
ACCRÉDITATIION SYNDICALE — « Domination » d'un syndicat par un 
employeur — Demande conjointe de deux syndicats pour former la majorité 
dans une unité de négociation, selon le Code du Travail. 
La Commission des relations du travail décide que le caractère de « domi-
nation » d'un syndicat par l'employeur, tel que prohibé par l'article 11 du 
Code du Travail, doit être apprécié par la Commission selon « la balance 
des probabilités », qui est la règle en droit civil. Une preuve circonstancielle, 
c'est-à-dire fondée sur des présomptions de faits, est suffisante pour décider 
« selon la balance des probabilités » qu'un syndicat est dominé par l'em-
ployeur. 
La Commission décide aussi que deux associations peuvent s'entendre pour 
former la majorité requise pour l'obtention d'une accréditation syndicale dans 
une unité de négociation donnée, et ce, même si le Code du Travail ne 
reproduit pas le deuxième paragraphe de l'article 4 de l'ancienne loi des 
relations ouvrières de Québec. 1 
LE CARACTERE DE «DOMINATION» 
. . . The issue first arose with an application by the Cutters' Union (filed on October 
29th, 1962) for certification as bargaining agent for « tous les tailleurs de dessus et de 
doublure à la main et à la machine » in the employ of Boucher & Lefaivre at its Papineau 
plant. The application was opposed by the Company on the ground, inter alia, that the 
bargaining unit was inappropriate. Shortly thereafter, (on November 13th, 1962) while 
the application of the Cutters' Union was being processed, the Association applied to be 
certified as bargaining agent for « tous les employés travaillant à la fabrication de la chaus-
sure à la main ou à la machine » in the said plant. 
The Cutters' Union opposed this application chiefly on the ground that the Association 
was employer dominated, and not a bona fide association within the meaning of the Act. 
The Company did not oppose the Association^ demand. 
We made our statutory inquiry in the usual way regarding both applications, and then 
directed that a hearing be held to deal with the question, among others, whether the cutters 
constitute an appropriate group for bargaining purposes in the circumstances of the case. 
1 L'Union des employés de MacFariane-Lefaivre Mfg. Ltd (Division Labelle) et l'Union 
des Ouvriers du cuir de Montréal, Local L-102, l'Union des Tailleurs en Chaussures, 
118 LF, Locaux de l'Amalgamated Méat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N.A. (AFL-
CIO-CTC) les deux locaux conjointement, et Boucher et Lefaivre Ltd, la Commission 
des Relations du Travail; Dossier No. 8471-1-2-3, R-748A (1962) et R-34 (1964), 
Montréal, le 18 janvier 1965, Juge A.B. Gold, J.M.C. 
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Public hearings were held on this issue on March 26th, December 5th, December 6th and 
December 9th, 1963, and as our inquiry vvas not then completed, the case was put over to 
a later date. 
On January 17th, 1964, while the matter was still pending, and awaiting its turn on 
the roll for further hearing, the Amalgamated applied for certification as the bargaining 
agent for « les employés de la production de la chaussure payés à l'heure et à la pièce » 
in the employ of the Company at the said Papineau plant. At the same time, the Cutters' 
Union discontinued its first demand to be certified as bargaining agent for the cutters 
alone. 
The Association and the Company both objected to the réception of the Amalgamated's 
application, and to the acceptance by the Board of the Cutters' Union discontinuance of its 
original demand, and we heard the parties on thèse preliminary questions at a hearing held 
on February 6th, 1964. 
On June 5th, 1964, we dismissed the objections raised by the Association and the 
Company, the whole as appears from our décision of record herein, and référence to which 
is made as if the same were herein set out at length. 
This left us with the two contending applications concerning the production forces, to 
which we hcve already referred, that of the Association filed on November 13th, 1962, and 
that of the Amalgamated, filed on January 17th, 1964. Thèse are the proceedings which 
are the subject of the présent décision. 
We made our statutory inquiry as required, and then directed that a hearing be held. 
The parties appeared before us with counsel and their witnesses on June 21 st, June 23rd, 
June 25th, September 28th, September 29th and September 30th, 1964, and were heard. 
We hâve taken time to consider the matter. 
The record clearly indicates that both associations enjoy the représentative character 
required for certification. Were there no other matters in issue we would hâve ordered a 
vote under Section 8 of the Act, or the latter portion of Section 25 of the Code, both of 
which provide for this remedy where « it appears that the said employées are members of 
more than one association in sufficient numbers to affect the décision ». This, however, 
was not to be, for as we hâve seen, the Amalgamated opposed the demand of the Associ-
ation on the ground that it is employer dominated, and hence not an association bona 
fide within tne meaning of our law. It is this question which is principally in issue hère, 
ond most of the évidence made before us deals with this aspect of the case. 
It remain only to say that the issue of employer domination is one of public order, 
and may be dealt with in our inquiry, proprio motu. It is to this question that we now 
direct our attention. 
It is convenient to set out at this point the material provisions of law under which the 
issues arise. Because, as we hâve seen, the applications in this case were filed under the 
Act, we turn first to it. We begin with domination; this is dealt with in the Act by the 
following Sections : 
« 20. No employer, nor person acting for an employer or an association of 
employers, shall in any manner seek to dominate or hinder the formation or 
the activities of any association of employées. 
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44. Any person who fails to comply with any obligation or prohibition imposed 
by this act or by a régulation or décision of the Board is guilty of an offence 
and Itable, unless another penalty is applicable, to a fine of not less than one 
hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars for each day or portion 
of a day during which the offence continues 
46. The following shall be a party to an offence and liable to the penalty 
provided in the same manner as the person committing the offence; any person 
who aids or abets the commission thereof and, when the offence is committed 
by a corporation or an association, every director, administrator, manager 
or officer shall be guilty of the offence who, in any manner, approves of the 
act which constitutes the offence or acquiesces therein. 
47. If several persons conspire to commit an offence, each of them shall 
be guilty of each offence committed by any of them in the carrying out of 
their common intention. 
48. The pénalties contemplated by this act sha!! be imposed upon summary 
proceeding pursuant to the Québec Summary Convictions Act (chap. 29). 
Part II of the said act shall apply to such proceedings. 
49. Any pénal prosecution under this act may be taken by the Board, or 
by any interested party with the written authorization of the Board or the 
consent of the Attorney-General. 
50. If it be (sic — should read proven) provided to the Board that an 
association has participated in an offence against section 20, the Board may, 
without préjudice to any other penalty, decree the dissolution of such associ-
ation after giving it an opportunity to be heard and to produce any évidence 
tending to exculpate it. 
In the case of a professional syndicate, an authentic copy of the décision 
shall be transmitted to the Provincial Secretary who shall give notice thereof 
in the Québec Officiai Gazette. » 
Furthermore, By-Law No. 1 (enacted pursuant to the Act) contains the following 
Section, which applies, namely : 
« 2 . For the purpose of determining the character of good faith of an 
association, the following conditions shall be complied with : 
c) The association shall comply with the conditions set forth in paragraphe 
« d » of section 2 of the Act; 
d) The Board shall take into considération the observance of sections 20, 
21, 22, 24 and 25 of the Act.» 
Domination is dealt with in the Code under Sections 11, 125/ and 128 to 132 (in-
clusive). Sections 128 to 132, (inclusive) are Verbatim reproductions of Sections 46 to 50 
(inclusive) of the Act, and need not be repeated hère. 
Section 11 of the Code enlarges upon Section 20 of the Act, but essentially the two 
provisions are the same. Section 125 of the Code is a spécifie section which créâtes an 
offence for infringement of Sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Code, replacing in part Section 
44 of the Act, the gênerai provisions of which are reteined (with some modification) as 
Section 126 of the Code. For our purposes, it is sufficient to examine in détail Sections 
11 and 125 of the Code, which read as follows: 
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« 11. No employer, or person acting for an employer or an association of 
employers, shall in any manner seek to dominate, hinder or finance the form-
ation or the activities of any association of employées, or to participate therein. 
« No association of employées, or person acting on behalf of any such organ-
ization, shall belong to an association of employers or seek to dominate, hinder 
or finance the formation or activities of any such association, or to participate 
therein. 
125. Any person who infringes any provision of section 11, 12 or 13, is guilty 
of an offence and liable to a fine of one hundred to one thousand dollars 
for each day or portion of a day during which such offence continues. » 
It is sufficient to read Section 20 of the Act and Section 11 of the Code to see their 
basic similarity. While Section 11, by the addition of the terms « f inance», and «par t i -
cipate », appears to enlarge upon the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, in fact, the new 
législation is merely a récognition and clarification of the judicial interprétation placed 
upon the old enactment by our prior practice and jurisprudence. It remains only to state 
at this point that under the Act « association » is defined as follows: 
« 2 . — In this act and in its application, unless the context requires other-
wise, the following words and expressions hâve the meaning hereinafter given 
to them : 
d) «Association» includes a professional syndicate, a union of such syndi-
cales, a group of employées or of employers, bona fide, having es object 
the régulation of relations between employers and employées and the study, 
defence and development of the économie, social and moral interests of its 
members, with respect for law and authority; » 
Under the Code « association of employées » is defined in the following terms: 
« 1 . In this code, unless the context requires otherwise, the following 
expressions mean : 
a. « association of employées » — a group of employées constituted as a 
professional syndicate, union, brotherhood or otherwise, having as its objects 
the study, safeguarding and development of the économie, social and educa-
tional interests of its members and particulariy the negotiation and applic-
ation of collective agreements; » 
The new définition of « association of employées » in the Code is an improvement in 
language, but not a change or modification in the basic object or purposes of the original 
enactment. The new section in the Code leaves us with a définition that is perhaps more 
élégant and more précise but essentially it is the same définition that we find in the Act. 
The deletion of the terms « bona fide », and « with respect for law and authority », is 
merely a pruning of useless verbiage — it is nothing more nor less than literary surgery. 
Surely no one will suggest that by eliminating thèse terms in the définition of « association » 
in the Code, it was the législative intent to direct us to certify an association which is in 
bad faith and which does not respect law and authority. We hâve no doubt that under the 
Code, as under the Act, an association must hâve as its honest purpose and object the 
protection and the defence of the interests of its members, and must pursue thèse objects 
in good faith and with respect for law and authority; otherwise it is simply not an associ-
ation within the meaning of our law. 
Having corne to this conclusion, it is unnecessary to décide what is in the présent 
instance the purely académie question whether Section 136 of the Code is intended to 
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hâve rétrospective effect, and whether or not By-law No. 1 is now in force, for in either 
case the resuit is the same. We are satisfied that both under the old law and the new an 
association which is dominated by the empicper is net an association in good faith, and is 
not therefore an association within the letter or spirit of the law. A dominated association 
is a sham and a fraud ; and as such is not entitled to certification under any circumstances. 
This leads us to several other questions of law which it is just as well to dispose of hère. 
We begin with the proposition that although the act of dominating an association is 
an offence both under the Act and the Code, punishable upon summary proceeding pursuant 
to the Québec Summary Convictions Act, the proceeding now before us is not a crirninal or 
quasi-criminal matter, but on the contrary is a civil matter, and is therefore to be decided 
upon « the balance of probabilities », which is the rule in civil cases. 
In Industrial Acceptance Corporation v. Couture, 1954 S.C.R. 34, Fauteux, J., had this 
to say, at page 43 : 
« . . . dans une cause civile où la preuve d'un crime est matérielle au succès 
de i'action, la règle de preuve applicable n'est pas celle prévalant dans une 
cause criminelle où les sanctions de la loi pénale sont recherchées, mais celle 
régissant la détermination de l'action au civil. » 
(Also see the London Life Insurance Company v. Chase, 1963 S.C.R. 207, and the 
authorities therein cited.) 
In Montréal Tramways Company v. Léveillée, 1933 S.C.R. 456, Lamont, J., expressed 
the following opinion, at page 466: 
«The gênerai principle in accordance with which in cases iike the présent 
the sufficiency of the évidence is to be determined was stated by Lord 
Chancellor Loreburn in Richard Evans & Co., Limited v. Astley (1911 A.C. 
678), as foilows : 
' It is, of course, impossible to lay down in words any scale or standard by 
which you can measure the degree of proof which will suffice to support a 
particular conclusion of fact. The applicant must prove his case. This does 
not mean that he must demonstrate his case. If the more probable conclusion 
is that for which he contends, and there is anything pointing to it, then the-e 
is évidence for a Court to act upon. Any conclusion short of certainty 
may be miscalled conjecture or surmise but Courts, iike individuals, habitually 
act upon a balance of probabilit ies.'» 
In Rousseau v. Bennett et al., 1956 S.C.R. 89, Taschereau, J., as he was then, had 
this to say, at page 92: 
« L'Honorable Juge de première instance a jugé suivant la balance des 
probalilités, ce qui est la preuve requise en matière civile, et je crois que le 
jugement de la Cour d'Appel est erroné en droit quand cette dernière conclut 
qu'il n'y a pas de présomption tellement forte qu'elle exclut toute autre 
possibilité. Ce n'est pas ce que la loi requiert. Il y a une distinction fonda-
mentale qu'il faut faire entre le droit criminel et le droit civil. En matière 
criminelle, la Couronne doit toujours prouver la culpabilité de l'accusé au-delà 
d'un doute raisonnable. En matière civile, la balance des probabilités est 
le facteur décisif. Comme le disait M. le Juge Duff dans la cause de Clark 
v. Le Roi (1921 — 61 Can. S.C.R. 608 at 616) : 
' Broadly speaking, in civil proceedings the burden of proof being upon a 
party to establish a given allégation of fact, the party on whom the burden 
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lies is not called upon to establish his allégation in a fashion so rigorous as 
to leave no room for doubt in the mind of the tribunal with whom the décision 
rests. It is gêneraily speaking, sufficient if he has produced such a pré-
pondérance of évidence as to shew that the conclusion he seeks to establish 
is substcntially the most probable of the possible views of the facts. ' 
Les tribunaux doivent souvent agir en pesant les probalilités. Pratiquement rien 
ne peut être mathématiquement prouvé (Jérôme v. Prudential Insurance Co. 
of America, 1939 — 6 Ins. L.R. 59 at 60; Richard Evans b Co. Ltd. v. 
Astley, 1911 A.C. 674 at 678; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Schlitt, 1945 
S.C.R. 289 at 300; Doe D. Devine v. Wilson, 10 Moore P.C. 502 at 532) .» 
In Harry Mahon et al. and Dame Bessie Lang et vir, an unreported judgment of the 
Suprême Court of Canada, rendered on October 22nd, 1946, Rand, J., expressed the following 
views: 
« Whether the conclusion of one fact from the existence of another is a 
legitimate inference or a were spéculation dépends in law upon its character-
ization in that degree of expérience which the tradition of légal reasoning 
has adopted; and the language of Lord Wright in Grant v. Australian Knitting 
Mills Limited (1936) A.C. 85 at page 96 puts the matter with his customary 
clarity : 
' This, however, does not do justice either to the process of reasoning by 
way of probable inference which has to do so much in human affairs, or to 
the nature of circumstantial évidence in the law courts. Mathematical, or 
strict logical, démonstration is generally impossible; juries are in practice told 
they must act on such reasonable balance of probabilities as would suffice 
to détermine a reasonable man to take a décision in the grave affairs of life. 
Pièces of évidence, each by itself insufficient, may together constitute a 
significant whole and justify by their combined effect a conclusion. » 
In the King v. Sincennes — McNaughton Line Limited, 1928 S.C.R. 84, Newcombe, J., 
hcd this to say, at page 86: 
« I think there is hère a prépondérance of probability which constitutes suffi-
cient ground for the finding of the learned trial judge. 
In Cooper v. Slade, Willes J., refers to the proposition as elementary that in 
civil cases the prépondérance of probability may constitute sufficient ground 
for a verdict, and he says that, so long since as the 14th of Elizabeth, Chief 
Dyer and a majority of the other Justices of the common Pleas laid it down 
that, when the parties are at issue the Justices may, if the matter be doubtful, 
found their verdict upon that which appears the most probable, and by the 
same reason that which is most probable shall be good évidence 
Newis v. Lark. I see no reason to doubt that the présent case should be 
governed by that rule, and the appeal therefore fails. » 
(Also see Jérôme v. Anderson et al. 1964 S.C.R. 291, at 299.) 
This leads us to the question of the evidentiary value of circumstantial évidence (a 
matter already touched upon in some of the authorities cited), because as learned counsel 
for the Amalgamated admitted, and there is no doubt that this is so, his case is founded 
in large measure upon évidence of this kind. Nor is this to be wondered at; indeed, it 
would be far more cause for wonder to find much direct évidence in a case of this sort. 
This is so self-evident as to need no authority, but the proposition has been put so aptly 
by a noted American jurist that we cannot resist citing his remarks. 
In the case of F.W. Woolworth Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, Circuit Court 
of Appeals, Second Circuit, 121 Fédéral Reporter 2nd séries 658, Frank, Circuit Judge, 
speaking for the Court, had this to say, at p. 660: 
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« (3) Implicit in petitioner's argument is a basic objection to reliance upon 
so-called circumstantial évidence. But courts and others triers of facts, in 
a multitude of cases, must rely upon such évidence, i.e., inferences from 
testimony as to attitudes, acts and deeds; where such matters as purpose, 
plans, designs, motives, intent or similar matters, are involved, the use of 
such inference is often indispensable. (Cf. Wigmore, Principles of Judicial 
Proof (1931) 7-8, 30, 734-743) Persons engaged in unlawful conduct 
seldom write letters or make public pronouncements explicitly stating their 
attitudes or objectives; such facts must usually be discovered by inference; 
the évidence does not corne in package labelled, 'Use me', like the cake, 
bearing the words 'Eat me', which Alice found helpful in Wonderland. » 
(Emphasis added) 
Under our law, circumstantial évidence is properly know as presumptions of fact, which 
under Article 1242 of the Civil Code are « left to the discrétion end judgment of the 
Court ». 
The ruies governing circumstantial évidence in civil cases hâve been ofttimes cited and 
reviewed and it is unnecessary to do more hère than to refer briefly to several leading 
authorities. 
In the case of Montréal Tramways Company v. Léveillée (supra), Lamont, J., had this 
to say, at page 469: 
« In Jones v. G.W. Rly Co. (1930 — 47 T.L.R. 39) the House of Lords had to 
consider whether there was évidence on which a jury could properly find 
négligence on the part of the Defendant's servants which caused or contributed 
to the death of the husband cf the first Plaintiff. In stating the principles 
which should govern in such a case, Lord MacMillan, at page 45, said : 
'The dividing line between conjecture and inference is often a very difficult 
one to drawn. A conjecture may be plausible but it is of no légal value, for 
its essence is that it is a mère guess. An inference in the légal sensé, on 
the other hand, is a déduction from the évidence, and if it is a reasonable 
déduction it may hâve the validity of légal proof. The attribution of an 
occurence to a cause is, I take it, always a matter of inference. The cogency 
of a légal inference of causation may vary in degree between practical 
certainty and reasonable probability. Where the coïncidence of cause and 
effect is not a matter of actual observation there is necessarily a hiatus in 
the direct évidence, but this may be legitimately bridged by an inference 
from the facts actually observed and proved. ' 
An instance of a case where this Court 'bridged the hiatus' is that of Shawini-
gan Engineering Co. v. Naud (1929 Can. S.C.R. 341). It is sufficient to refer 
to the judgment of the Court (Duff, Mignault, Newcombe, Rinfret and 
Smith, JJ.) more particularly to the passage from the foot of page 344 to 
the end of page 345, to realize how strikingly similar the problem of the 
relation of cause and effect happened to be both in that case and in the 
présent case. By article 1242 C.C. presumptions not established by law are 
left to the discrétion and judgment of the Court. The corresponding article 
in the Code Napoléon (art. 1353) is to the same effect but with the limitation 
that the Court will admit only such presumptions as are 'graves, précises 
et concordantes', by which is meant presumptions in which the connection 
between the facts established in évidence and the fact to be proved is such 
that the existence of the known facts establishes by inference or déduction 
the fact in dispute. 
Article 1242 of the Québec Civil Code does not contain the limitation of the 
Code Napoléon but as a presumption to be admitted as légal proof is ne-
cessarily a déduction from proven facts, there is, perhaps, but little if any 
différence between the meaning to be ascribed to the two articles. See the 
Montréal Rolling Mills v. Corcoran (1896 — 26 Can. S.C.R. 595) .» 
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In Casswell and Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Limited, 1940 A.C. 152 (House 
of Lords), Lord Wright had this to say, at page 169: 
« My Lords, the précise manner in which the accident occured cannot be 
ascertained as the unfortunate young man was alone when he was killed. 
The Court therefore is left to inference or circumstantial évidence. Infe-
rence must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or spéculation. There 
can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the 
other facts v/hich it is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can 
be inferred with as much practical certainty as if they had been actually 
observed. In other cases the inference does not go beyond reasonable proba-
bility. But if there are no positive proved facts from which the inference 
can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mère spécul-
ation or conjecture. 
In the présent case there are, I think, certain know facts which enable some 
inferences to be drawn. Beyond that point the method of inference stops and 
what is suggested is conjecture. » 
Finally, in Jérôme v. Anderson et al. (supra) Cartwright, J v had this to say, at page 
SCO: 
« I accept as accurate the statement in Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, 
7th éd., at u. 435 : 
' The effect of a body of circumstantial évidence is sometimes compared to 
that of a chain, but the metaphor is inaccurate, since the weakest part of 
the chain is also its stronyest. 
« Such évidence is more aptly to be compared to a rope made up of many 
strands twisted together. The rope has strength more than sufficient to bear 
the stress laid upon it, though no one of the filaments of which it is composed 
would be sufficient for the purpose. » 
(Also see the remarks of Rand, J., in Mahon and Lang, already cited, supra.) 
This, in turn, leads us directly to the meaning to be given to « domination » under our 
law. The term is nowhere defined, neither in the Act nor in the Code, and we therefore 
assume that it is to be given its ordinary meaning, for as both our statutes « deal with 
matters relating to the gênerai public (they are) presumed to use words in their popular 
sensé; uti loquitur vulgus. » (Maxwell, On the Interprétation of Statutes, l l t h Edition, page 
53.) 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines « to dominate» as « to bear rule over control, 
sway; to hâve a commanding influence on; to master ». 
The French définitions are to the same effect, as we would expect, since the term has 
its roots in Latin. 
Thus Quillet, Dictionnaire de la Langue Française defines « dominer » as « commander 
souverainement, avoir une préséance absolue, exercer de l'empire, de l'influence. » 
When, then, or under what circumstances, can it be said that an association is domin-
ated by the employer? 
It is not necessary or even désirable, and indeed it would be unwise to seek to lay 
down an all-embracing set of ruies and considérations which présume to take into account 
ail possible cases and contingencies. Each case must naturally be judged on its own 
particular facts. And yet, we hâve found in our expérience — and our décisions in the 
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past reflect this expérience —• that certain circumstances are indicative and oft-times 
conclusive of employer domination. In this respect our expérience parallels, that of our 
sister boards elsewhere, whose enabling statutes are the inspiration of our own law in this 
domain, or dérive from common sources, and whose purposes are the same, although the 
language may somewhat differ. On this point, we note that section 20 of the Act, and 
section 11 of the Code which reproduced it (with some additions) are almost Verbatim 
reproductions of Section 8 (2) of the National Labour Relations Act of 1935, popularly 
known as the Wagner Act), législation enacted by the Congress of the U.S.A. and which 
served as a model for much of the subséquent labour law throughout the North American 
continent, including Canada and our own province. Section 8 (2) of the Wagner Act was 
drafted in the following terms: 
«8. It shall be an unfair labour practice for an employer : 
1 ) 
2) To dominate or interfère with the formation or administration of any 
labour organization or contribute financial or other support to it. » 
The Labour Management Relations Act, 1947 (generally called the Taft-Hartley Act) 
which amended the Wagner Act, reproduced Section 8 (2), supra, as Section 8 (a) (2), 
with a proviso not hère material. Subséquent amendments to this législation hâve no 
relevance hère. 
As long ago as December 1939 the National Labour Relations Board (hereinafter called 
the NLRB), created under the Wagner Act, set out certain characteristics which, on the 
basis of its own expérience, served to distinguish an employer-dominated association from 
a bona fide trade union. Subséquent décisions of the NLRB and of the American courts 
confirm the validity of thèse findings, and apply the principles therein contained. Needless 
to say, cases decided by the NLRB under its enabling législation and by the American 
courts in interpreting this législation are not binding authorities upon us. They are none 
the less entitled to the greatest respect, particularly since our expérience in labour law and 
industrial relations has followed closely, if not actually duplicated (although at a slower 
rate), the American expérience. In particular, employer domination hère has followed 
essentially the same pattern as employer domination in the U.S.A. and elsewhere in Canada. 
An analysis of our own décisions and policy in this field indicates that we hâve adopted 
and consistently followed (with very rcre exceptions not material hère) the principles first 
set out by the NLRB more than 25 years ago. We should perhaps add that we hâve 
adopted thèse principles as our ov/n not « by reason of authority but by authority of reason », 
and because they are most « consistent with the smooth working of the System » which 
our labour law purports to regulate, and harmonize well with its basic intents and purposes. 
Drawing, therefore, upon our own expérience, and that of our sister boards elsewhere, 
insofar as applicable, and without in any way claiming to be exhaustive, we list hereunder 
what we believe to be the principal characteristics of an employer-dominated association, 
holding the view that depending upon the circumstances, it is generally a fair conclusion 
that domination exists where thèse factors exist in some reasonable combination. Thèse 
then are the principal characteristics of an employer-dominated association: 
1) It is generally formed as a so-called independent association at a time when a 
bona fide « outside » trade union or organization is already organizing the shop. 
2) It is always supported by the employer, directly or indirectly or both. This support 
may be either matériel or moral, or both. The most obvious examples of material support 
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are the free use of company premises for the holding of meetings, the use of company 
facilities, such as office equipment, paper and incidentals necessary for the material organ-
ization of the campaign, the payment of time to the employées during which they attended 
meetings on the plant premises or elsewhere, the coopération of management and/or 
managerial employées to ensure that the workers hâve not only the time but the opportunity 
of joining the association and/or their being subjected to propaganda to induce them 
to join. 
Moral support is best exemplified by management's letting it be known directly or 
indirectly that it looks with favour upon the independent association, that the latter is a 
« good » union, and for the benefit of the workers, while on the other hand the « outside » 
union is a bad « union ». 
3) Its organizers are generally without expérience in labour organization and tum 
to management for help in ail or some phases of the matter. In some cases management 
participâtes, — more or less directly, in others it merely advises the organizers where to 
go to get the necessary assistance, — usually the officers of another independent associ-
ation which has been successfully set up and maintained in a rival plant in the some or 
related industry — but in ail cases the organizers do not act alone. 
4) It succeeds in its organization campaign with remarkable speed and ease.. It 
usually recruits close to 100% membership within the short space of a few hours, and 
without a single dissenting voice. 
5) It is able to obtain immédiate check-off of union dues from the employer, usually 
followed by the rapid acceptance of a labour agreement, ail this without certification, and, 
where there is an outside union in contention, without having to await a décision of the 
issues by the appropriate judicial authority. In this connection the quick and close co-
opération between the employer and the association — indeed in some cases the use of the 
word collaboration is more appropriate than co-operation — is always ground for suspicion, 
particularly when there is no prior history of a bona fide employer-employée relationship, 
and where the employer has shown himself to be anti-union in sentiment towards an outside 
union trying to organize his plant. 
6) It is generally a one-plant or one-company association. This is quite easy to 
understand, for being created or instigated to serve the purpose of the employer, it is more 
easily manageable, and more logical, that it be restricted to a one plant or one employer 
unit. 
Thèse then are the factors which we must bear in mind in deciding whether domination 
exists in any given cases. We hasten, however, to add several words of caution. 
1 ) The first rule is that each case necessarily dépends upon its own facts, and it is 
in applying the facts in the case to the guide-lines hereinabove enunciated that a décision 
must be made. 
2) The second rule is that the différent factors hereinabove enunciated are not 
necessarily of equal weight or importance, and certainly are not necessarily always of the 
same weight or importance in différent cases. Their weight dépends upon the particular 
facts of the instance to which they are applied. 
3) It remains only to say, of course, that as good faith is presumed under our law, 
the burden of proving domination is upon the party alleging it. On the other hand, once 
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the weight of the évidence, direct or inferential, points to domination, the burden shifts, 
and it then falis to the association and/or the employer concerned to rebut the presumption 
and to prove that domination does not exist. 
This having been said we turn now to the évidence before us. Tne facts are not 
basically in dispute. The question is as to the inferences to be drcwn from the established 
facts The principles that apply in the premises hâve already been discussed. 
We hâve already seen that the Association applied for certification immediately after 
the organization of the cutters by the Cutters' Union and while the latter's application was 
pending. Furthermore it is not disputed that the Amalgamated Méat Cutters & Butcher 
Workmen of North America, the mother union and its two locals concerned are bona fide 
associations and « outside » unions, in the sensé earlier employed by us. 
As for the Association, its history goes back to 1947 At that time the employées of 
Labelle, the owner of the Maisonneuve plant, organized themselves into an independent 
association, incorporated under the Professional Syndicates Àct, (R.S.Q. 1941, chapter 142) 
as the Union des Employés de R. Labelle Limitée. It then applied to the Board for cer-
tification and in due course received our certificate. 
Sometime in 1958, MacFarlane (J Lefaivre look over the assets of Labelle, including 
the Maisonneuve plant, which it then named its Labelle division, presumably after the 
former owner. The Association then applied for, and obtained, supplementary letters patent 
changing its nome to Union des Employés de MocFarlane Lefaine Mfg. Ltd. (division 
Labelle), to conform to the new state of affairs, end this is the name that the Association 
still bears. 
Concurrently, the Association appiied for a new certificate, deeming it necessary to 
do so, we assume, because of the judgment recently rendered by the Court of Appeal in the 
case of Syndicat National des Travailleurs de la Pulpe et du Papier de la Tuque Inc., v. 
Commission de Relations Ouvrières, (1958 K.B. 1). The Association was then in contention 
with another trade union and we ordered a représentation vote between them. The Asso-
ciation won the élection, and on January 9th, 1959, was duiy certified once more as bar-
gaining agent for the employées of the Maisonneuve plant. 
From then on, the Association negotiated collective labour agreements with the new 
employer, MacFarlane-Lefaivre, the last of thèse agreements, and the only one material 
hère, was for a period of two years terminating December 23rd, 1962. 
We corne now to the Papineau plant, which is the plant directly in issue in this case. 
Boucher G Lefaivre is, and has been, the owner and operator of this plant for some time 
prior to 1962. When the Cutters' Union applied for certification, on October 29th, 1962, 
the Papineau plant was a non-union shop ; to use the well-known colloquialism in labour 
matters, « le champ était l ibre». 
It is in évidence that by the end of August 1962, twelve out of the sixteen cutters in 
the bargaining unit had joined the Cutters' Union, and hat it did not take too long for 
this to corne to the ears of management. In fact, by early October, if not before, the 
gênerai manager of the Company was well aware that the Papineau plant cutters were 
organized. 
On Thursday, October ! l th , 1962, at the end of the day's work, three cutters were 
loid off. Whether thèse lay-offs were justified or not we do not hère décide, but one thing 
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is certain, ail the cuters, as a group, believed thèse lay-offs ta be reprisais for their union 
activity and hence contrary to law. The cutters immediately got in touch with Mr. Aurelien 
Dallaire, (hereinafter called Dallaire), the local business représentative and agent ôf the 
Cutters' Union, who then telephoned Mr. Louis Rivard, (hereinafter called Rivard), the 
production manager of the Company at the Papineau plant. Dallaire identified hïmself, 
and told Rivard that he was authorized to speak for ail thé cutters in the group, and 
asked for the immédiate reinstatement of the three among them who had been laid off 
that way. After some discussion, a meeting was orranged for the following morning, Friday, 
October 12th. That morning, the cutters did not report for work; instead, they came to 
the plant with Dallaire in order to attend he meeting that had been arranged on their 
behalf. At this meeting, Dallaire told Rivard that ail the cutters were members of the 
Cutters' Union, to which Rivard replied that he was well aware of the fact and had known 
it for some time. Dealing with the lay-offs, Rivard denied that they were connected in any 
way with the union activity of the group, stating that they were due solely to lack of work. 
The cutters then advised Rivard that they would ail stay away from work until the three 
cutters were reinstated. Rivard undertook to take the matter up with Mr. René Boucher, 
(hereinafter called Boucher) the «grand patron», and gênerai manager of the Company, 
who was not in the Papineau plant at the time, stating that he would communicate with 
Dallaire as soon as he had some news. The meeting broke up on that note, and the cutters 
and Dallaire lefs the plant. 
The cutters did not work that day, nor did they retum to the plant premises ùntil 
the following Monday, October 15th. 
On Friday, at 5.00 p.m., Rivard, truô to his word, called Dallaire, and asked hirri to 
tell the cutters to corne in on Monday morning, for a further meeting to discuss their 
return to work. 
It is necessary at this point to tum back the dock a short while. At about the same 
time that Rivard was meeting with Dallaire and the cutters on Friday morning, the 12th, 
Boucher was meeting with the président and two other officers of the Association. This 
meeting took place in Boucher's office in the Maisonneuve plant, and it is significant 
that it is the first occasion on which Boucher, or any other member of management of the 
Company had any dealings with the Association, or any of its officers. The Association 
contends that it initiated this meeting for the purpose of asking Boucher's permission to 
organize the employées of the Papineau plant, a seemingly logical step since it was already 
certified in the Maisonneuve plant recently taken over by the Company. We do not açcept 
this contention, and we find the évidence on this point not worthy of crédit. We are 
satisfied that the meeting between Boucher and the officers of the Association was initiated 
by Boucher 0 Lefaivre, in order to invite the Association to organize its employées in the 
Papineau plant, as a means of frustrating the Cutters' Union from obtaining a foothold in 
the shop. Be that as it may, there is no doubt, and indeed it is admitted, that on that 
day, Friday, the 12th, in the late morning or early afternoon, the three officers of the 
Association drove with Boucher in Boucher's automobile from the Maisonneuve plant to 
the Papineau plant, in order to organize the employées of that shop. Having arrived, they 
arranged to meet with several senior employées of the Papineau plant (hereinafter called 
the Papineau organizers) to obtain their direct and immédiate help in the campaign. The 
Papineau organizers were chosen from the différent departments in the plant. (There was 
of course, no one from the cutting department as ail the cutters had walked off the job.) 
Permission was then requested from Rivard and obtained, to hold a gênerai meeting of ail 
the employées for that very afternoon. 
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At 4.00 p.m. that day, a mass meeting of the total work force was held in the f i t t ing 
department, on the 3rd floor of the plant. Immediately prior to the meeting the Papineau 
organizers went through the shop, department by department, telling the employées (who 
were ail at work) to stop working, and where necessary to stop their machines, and to go 
to the meeting that has been called. This was done in the présence of the foreman of the 
department, and of the other supervisory employées, and as we hâve already indicated, 
was carried out with the fui! knowledge and permission of management. Indeed, it could 
not hâve been done otherwise. It is in évidence that the employées were taken by surprise, 
and there was some small confusion and anxiety on their part, for they had no prior 
knowledge of the meeting, nor of its purpose. Those who wanted to know what was going 
on were given little, if any, information but the impression was clear that it was the wish 
of management that they attend. 
The effect was an absolute and total shut down of production during the time of the 
meeting, which lasted for approximately one hour. Al! employées who were then in the 
plant were présent, about 150 persons in ail. The meeting was addressed by only one 
speaker, Mr. Roméo Huard, (hereinafter called Huard) one of the Papineau organizers and 
a long time employée of Boucher & Lefaivre. His address was short and to the point. He 
told them that he spoke on behalf cf the Association, that the Association was the certified 
agent for the employées of the Maisonneuve plant and had a collective labour agreement 
covering them which it had signed with MacFarlane h Lefaivre (the former owner), that 
the agreement conferred certain benefits upon the employées, and that if the workers in 
the Papineau plant joined the Association, the latter would negotiate a similar agreement 
with Boucher & Lefaivre to cover them. Huard made the proposition attractive, promising 
better working conditions, bonuses and other benefits. 
In the meantime, application cards and check-off forms had been prepared in great 
haste. In fact, it would appear that the ink was barely dry on most of them whey they 
were brought up to the meeting. Thèse cards and forms were prepared on the premises 
of the Papineau plant, either by management or with its active coopération and assistance. 
The testimony of the officers of the Association who gave évidence to the contrary is not 
worthy of crédit, and is rejected. 
Huard's efforts were crowned with remarkable, not to say astonishing, success. In less 
than one hour almost everyone at the meeting signed application cards to join the Asso-
ciation, together with check-off forms authorizing the Company to deduct their monthly 
dues from their pay, and at the same time paid the $1.00 initiation fee required by the 
constitution of the Association. 
Several employées who were either in doubt or somewhat confused by the speed with 
which events were moving, asked for advice from their foreladies, and were quickly assured 
that the Association was « une bonne chose ». AU in ail, the Association's campaign, if 
we may call it that — we are somewhat tempted to use the word « blitzkrieg », although 
not in the péjorative sensé — was an overwhelming success. Every member of the work 
force in the plant, except the cutters who, as we hâve seen, had stayed away from work, 
and several other employées who were absent for other reasons, joined the Association 
during the course of the meeting. It would also appear from the évidence that the time 
lost by the employées during the course of the meeting was not deducted from their wages. 
It is important to recall that the meeting was held at a time when, to the knowledge 
of management, there were no cutters in the plant, nor any likelihood that there would be 
in view of the circumstances. 
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The success of the Association^ campaign did not, however, settle the question of the 
cutters, a question which was still acute. It will be recalled that Rivard telephoned Dallaire 
on Friday, the 12th at 5.00 p.m., and arranged for a meeting the following Monday, the 15th. 
On that day, Daliaire and the cutters met with management in the plant.. Boucher was 
présent at the meeting and made it abundantly clear that he looked with considérable 
disfavour upon the Cutters' Union, and its entry into the plant. While Boucher ostensibly 
paid iip service to the principle of freedom of association, there is no doubt that the 
purpose of the meeting (as that of subséquent meetings) was to induce the cutters, to leave 
the Cutters' Union and to join the Association which was now ensconced in the plant, 
indeed, Boucher made it clear, as did Rivard, that everything would be settled, and al! 
would be well if the cutters only abandoned their Union, and joined the ranks of the 
Association. 
However the cutters stood firm, and said so in no uncertain terms. It is then that 
Boucher stated in the following or similar terms: « Restez avec votre union, si vous voulez; 
moi j 'ai la mienne; moi je suis le patron; il faut que je me protège». The testimony of 
the several witnesses called on behalf of the Amalgamated on this point is uncontradicted. 
Boucher did not give évidence before us. 
Although the cutters did not join the Association, they did return to work shortly 
thereafter, and matters remained in suspense for the time being. 
Sometime in the middle of December of that year, a further meeting was held between 
the parties in an effort to bring the cutters into the Association. By that time, of course, 
the Association had already applied to be certified as bargaining agent for ail production 
employées, hence including the cutters, in the plant. At this meeting, there were some 
veiled hints that as Christmas bonuses were a matter of discrétion with management they 
might be withheld from the cutters if they remained adamant, but the cutters remained 
loyal to their Union and refused to join the Association. !n fairness to the employer, it 
should be stated that the cutters received their Chrismas bonuses and ail other subséquent 
benefit which were paid to the work force without discrimination under the new collective 
labour agreement which the Company signed with the Association. 
It remains only to recall that sometime during the latter part of 1963 the Amalgamated 
organized the total production force of the Papineau plant and on January 17th, 1964, 
applied for certification as their bargaining agent; at the same time the Cutters' Union 
discontinued its original application on behalf of the cutters only. 
Thèse then are the material facts. Has the Amalgamated made out its case against 
the Association ? We think that it has. After considération of the évidence in its entirely, 
and having regard to the authorities cited earlier, we are satisfied that upon « the balance 
of probabilités », the contestation of the Amalgamated is well founded. The weight of the 
évidence is clearly to the effect that at ail times material to the présent issues, and in 
particular at the time of the organization of the employées in the Papineau plant, the 
Association was dominated by the employer, and not an association in good faith within 
the meaning of our law. Under the circumstances the application of the Association is 
unfounded, and must be dismissed. 
There is no need to recapitulate the facts as we hâve already set them down in more 
than sufficient détail. It is sufficient to say that when the Association organized the 
employées and applied for certification, it lacked that essential characteristic of freedom 
of action and independence of spirit without which an association cannot be a true 
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association of employées within the meaning of our law. The rnanner in which the décision 
to organize was made ; the persons involved in that décision; the circumstances surrounding 
the original meeting with management; the co-operation by management, indeed the 
eagerness to cooperate; the recruiting on the plant premises during working hours; the 
haste with which the campaign was undertaken and completed ; the quick consent by 
management of the voluntary check-off ; the gênerai air of satisfaction and content which 
exuded from the Company and from its senior supervisory employées when the campaign 
was launched and succeeded ; the overwhelming success of the campaign; ail thèse things 
lead us to the conclusion that the purpose of the Association was not the defence and 
development of the économie, social and moral interests of its members, but rather assistance 
to the employer in preventing a bona fide association from entering the plant. Ali in ail, 
the Association had no independence of action ; it permitted itself to be used and was 
used by management as a tool to prevent the workers from exercising their free right of 
association, a right which is theirs and their alone. An association which lends itself to 
such a manoeuver, and which coopérâtes in such an unlawful purpose is not, and cannot 
be, an association within the meaning of our law. It is not in the public interest — indeed 
it is clearly contrary to the public interest — that an association that participâtes in on 
attempt to strike at the freedom of association of a group of workers be then recognized 
as their bargaining agent. Nor is the strength of this conclusion impaired because shortly 
thereafter the Association negotiated a collective agreement with the Company on behalf 
of he employées concerned. Indeed the consent of the Company to sign such an agreement 
before the Association was certified, and at a time when it was opposed and alleged to be 
dominated, tends to confirm the domination by the employer and the lack of good faith on 
the part of the Association. Nor can it be said that the relationship between the Association 
and the Company and the speedy conclusion of a collective labour agreement was merely 
évidence of good and harmonious employer-employée relations. There never was any 
relationship of any kind between Boucher ù Lefaivre and the Association prior to 
October 12th, 1962, when management invited the Association to organize its employées 
in its Papineau plant. Boucher b Lefaivre had never dealt with the Association prior to 
that time, and in fact none of the members of the Association had ever spoken to anybody 
in management before then. 
Whatever the past history of the Association may hâve been with Labelle and 
MacFarlane & Lefaivre, the former employers, and whether it was or was not a free and 
independent association vis-à-vis them, the fact remains that it had no bargaining history, 
no prior expérience of any kind, with Boucher b Lefaivre, the new employer. 
It is not, therefore, a case of the employer simply preferring a union he knew to one 
he did not know. The Association was new and unknown to the Company and if the 
Company took the Association to its bosom so quickly, it was because it had reasonable 
grounds to believe and expect that it would do its bidding and be a créature of its will. 
Ail the circumstances point to domination. The Association is tainted by it anâ so is its 
application for certification. 
For the foregoing reasons, we are to dismiss the said application, and there will be 
judgment accordingly. 
LE CERTIFICAT CONJOINT D'ACCREDITATION 
This leaves us with the application of the Amalgamated. The only argument raised 
against this application is contained in a lettre from learned counse! for the Association 
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dated Octcber 16th, 1964, (and received by us on October 19th, 1964) from which we cite 
the following portion that is material : 
« Les locaux 102 et 108 (sic) de deux associations différentes se sont asso-
ciées pour demander la reconnaissance syndicale. L'article 4 de la loi des 
relations ouvrières le permettait. 
Je soumets respectueusement que l'article 20 du code du travail ne le permet 
plus et qu'à ce titre, la demande de la partie adverse devrait être rejetée. 
(Je m'inspire de l'article d'un spécialiste en la matière, le R.P. Gérard 
Hébert, s.j. — la Revue Relations, octobre 1964, p. 297 à la note 1 — ) .» 
The note to which counsel refers is drafted in the following terms: 
« A propos de la tendance à fovoriser des unités de négociation restreintes 
nous avons omis de signaler, dans le premier article, l'observation suivante, 
La Loi des relations ouvrières disait explicitement que 'plusieurs associations 
de salariés (pouvaient) s'unir pour former cette majorité (majorité absolue 
des salariés dans l'unité de négociation) et nommer des représentants pour 
fin de négociation collective' (L.R.O., art. 4) . Le Code n'a pas retenu cette 
précision; il dit simplement : ' A droit à l'accréditation l'association de salariés 
groupant la majorité absolue des employés d'un employeur. ' (Code, art. 20) 
Selon les définitions du Code lui-même, on doit entendre par 'association de 
salariés ' ' un groupement de salariés constitué en syndicat professionnel, 
union, fraternité ou autrement' (Code, art. 1, a) . Reste à savoir quel sens 
il faut donner à ce dernier mot. Si on l'éclairé par ceux qui précèdent, il 
faudrait l'entendre d'un syndicat individuel formé sous un autre nom que ceux 
qu'indique le texte. De plus, l'emploi du singulier à l'article 20 semble con-
firmer cette interprétation. Quoi qu'il en soit, à l'encontre de la Loi des rela-
tions ouvrières, rien dans le Code ne fait allusion à une unité de négociation 
qui engloberait plusieurs associations de salariés. » 
Our own view is that counsel for the Association reads far more into the citation than 
the learned author intended to say ; witness the guarded language employed in the final 
sentence, which rather tends to leave the question open. But assuming that the author, 
indeed, is authority for the proposition urged upon us, and, in any event, dealing with the 
proposition as a submission on the part of the Association, we are contrained to say, with 
respect, that we do not agrée. Such a construction, in our judgment, takes far too narrow 
a view of the question and misconceives the législative intent. 
While we are inclined to share the view that «autrement» ( « otherwire » ) in the 
définition of « association of employées » should be comprehended in the restricted sensé 
required by the ejusdem generis doctrine, we do not believe that anything really turns 
upon this point. The real issue, in our opinion, lies in the proper construction of « associa-
tion of employées » in the context of the statute, as a whole, considering its basic scope, 
intent and purposes, and upon thèse considérations we believe the stand of the Association 
to be untenable. 
The rules of statutory construction and the authorities upon which we rely for the 
conclusion to which we hâve corne are the following. 
The Interprétation Àct, R.S.Q. 1941, c. I: 
« 2. This act shall apply to every statute of the Legistature of this Province, 
uniess and in so far as such application be inconsistent with the object, the 
context or any of the provisions of such statute. 
41. Every provision of a statute, whether such provision be mandatory, pro-
hibitive or pénal, shall be deemed to hâve for its object the remedying of some 
evil or the promotion of some good. 
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Such statute shall receive such fair, large and libéral construction as will 
ensure the attainment of its object and the carrying out of its provisions, 
according to their true intent. meaning and spirit. 
«54. The singular number shall extend to more than one person or more 
than one thing of the same sort, whenever the context adm its of such 
extension. » 
(Aiso see Brooks v. Pavlick, 1964 S.C.R. 108 at 113.) 
Canada Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Queen (1898) A.C. 735 (Privy Council) 
Per Lord Davey, at page 741 : — 
« Every clause of a statute should be construed with référence to the context 
and the other clauses of the Act, so as, so far as possible, to make a consis-
tent enactment of the whole statute or séries of statutes relating to the 
subject-matter. » 
Maxwell (op. cit.) at page 28 : 
« Passing from the external history of the statute to its contents, it is an 
elementary rule that construction is to be made of ail the parts together, and 
not of one part only by itself. Incivile est nisi tota lege perspecta una aliaua 
particula ejus proposita judicare vel respondere. Such a survey is often indis-
pensable, even when the words are the piainest; for the true meaning of any 
passage is that which (being permissible) best harmonises with the subject 
and with every other passage of the statute. ' It is, of course, impossible to 
construe particular words in a statute without référence to their context and 
to the whole ténor of the Act '. » 
(Aiso see Brooks v. Pavlick, 1964 S.C.R. 108 at 113.) 
Looking at the Code as a whole it is clear that it was enacted for the purpose of 
providing the machinery for collective bargaining as a means of achieving and maintaining 
industrial peace. Referring to the Act (which the Code replaces) Hyde, J., hcd this to 
say, in Price Brothers and Company Ltd. v. Letarte et al. (1953 K.B. 307, at page 312): 
a The scope and object of this statute is without question to provide the 
machinery for securing agreements between employers or groups of employers 
and their employées or group of employées. The scheme of the Act is to 
provide for the sélection of a bargaining représentative of the employées, the 
negotiation of the agreement, the arbitration of disputes arising both in the 
negotiation of the agreement and out of the opération of an agreement a l -
ready negotiated. » 
Under our law the certification process is the first step towards collective bargaining. 
Where, therefore, two constructions are possible, we must choose the one that encourages 
the process and enlarges its scope, rather that the one that discourages and curtails it. 
This is ail the more apparent when we consider the way in which the Code has enlarged 
upon the Act and broadened the area of certification. In doing so the legislator has given 
further évidence, if need be, of his intention to widen rather than narrow the base of trade 
union activity. It is inconceivable to us that, v/ith this in mind, he intended to make the 
process more dfficult, requiring in many cases serious, almost radical, changes in accepted 
internai trade union organization and practice. 
Having regard to the foregoing, we are satisfied that upon the proper construction 
of the Code as a whole, two or more groups of employées may join together to form an 
« association of employées » within the meaning of the Code, and that if they otherwise 
comply with our requirements for certification, they are entitled to a certificate as bargain-
ing agent for the groups concerned. 
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Any other view is untenable ; it would lead us to the conclusion that, contrary to the 
avowed intention of the legislator to encourage collective bargaining, « the accepted 
postdate of industrial peace », the Code intends to strike a near-fatal blow to the great 
many trade unions which, while organized by tradition on a craft or group basis, none the 
less organize on an industrial or all-employee basis, when appropriate, by joint applications 
made by two or more of their locals, acting together. To conclude that the legislator 
intended such a drastic and radical change from the existing law — a law which works 
and harmonizes best with the existing social structures in the System which the law was 
designed to regulate — would require a far more clear and explicit enactment than that 
which the Association contends may be inferred from the failure to reproduce in the Code 
the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Act. 
Maxwell (op. cit.) has this to say, at page 78: 
« Before adopting any proposed construction of a passage susceptible of more 
than one meaning, it is important to consider the effects or conséquences 
which would resuit from it, for they often point out the real meaning of the 
words. There are certain objects which the législature is presumed not to 
intend, and a construction which would lead to any of them is therefore to be 
avoided. It is not unfrequently necessary, therefore, to limit the effect of 
the words contained in an enactment (especially gênerai words), and some-
times to départ, not only from their primary and Iitérai meaning, but also from 
the rules of grammatical construction in cases where it seems highly im-
probable that the words in their wide primary or grammatical meaning actually 
express the real intention of the législature. It is regarded as more reason-
able to hold that the législature expressed its intention in a slovenly manner, 
than that a meaning should be given to them which could not hâve been 
intended. 
Presumption against Implicit Altération of Law. 
One of thèse presumptions is that the législature does not intend to make any 
substantiel altération in the law beyond what. i t explicitly déclares, either in 
expressed terms or by clear implication, or, in other words, beyond the immé-
diate scope and object of the statute. In ail gênerai matters outside those limits 
the law remains undisturbed. It is in the last degree improbable that the 
législature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or départ 
from the gênerai system of law, without expressing its intention with irrésis-
tible clearness, and to give any such effect to gênerai words, simply because 
they heve a meaning that would lead thereto when used in either their widest, 
their usual or their natural sensé, would be to give them a meaning other 
than that which was actually intented. General words and phrases, therefore, 
however wide and comprehensive they may be in their Iitérai sensé, must, 
usually, be construed as being limited to the actual objects of the Act. It 
would be ' perfectly monstrous ' to construe the gênerai words of the Act so as 
to al ter the previous policy of the law.» 
We hâve no doubt that the deletion of the second paragraph of Section 4 of the Act, 
and the failure to reproduce it in the Code was not for the purpose of removing a right 
which existed under the Act, and which the legislator did not wish to retain under the 
Code; the deletion was merely the élimination of surplus language. The paragraph was 
unnecessary even in the A c t ; and ail the more so in the Code. Its élimination was another 
instance of législative surgery upon useless language, to eliminate its possible misconstruction 
in the future. 
In Shonnon Realties v. Ville de St. Michel, 1924 A.C. 185, Lord Shaw had this to say, 
at page 192: 
«Where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be 
chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the System which 
the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected 
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vvhich will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of 
the System. » 
This is a further reason, if one be needed, for rejecting the construction urged upon 
by the Association. 
On the whole, therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the argument of the Association 
faits. 
Having corne to this conclusion it becomes unnecessary to décide whether the argument 
fails in any event because whatever rétrospective effect, if any, the transitory provisions 
of the Code are intended to hâve, they do not in this instonce operate to deprive the 
Amalgamated of its rights to certification acquired under he Act. In our view, whether we 
apply the Act or the Code to the détermination of the issues herein, and whether the 
transitory provisions of the Code ore rétrospective or not, the Amalgamated is entitled 
to succeed. 
After careful considération of the évidence, including the documents of record, the 
reports of our inspectors, and of the file in its en tire ty, we find that: 
1 ' The bargaining unit sought by the Amalgamated as herein earlier described is an 
appropriate unit in ail the circumstances of the case. 
2) The Amalgamated is an association of employées within the meaning of our law. 
3) The Amalgamated comprises among its members the absolute majority of the 
employées in the said bargaining unit. 
4) The Amalgamated has complied with ail légal requirements for certification as 
the bargaining agent for the employées in the said unit. 
In the circumstances, the Amalgamated is entitled to certification, and a certificate 
will therefore issue. 
CONSIDERING that at ail times matériel to the présent issues the Association herein 
was dominated by the Company ; 
CONSIDERING that, insofar as the présent instance is concerned, the Association 
was not and is not an association of employées within the meaning of our law ; 
CONSIDERING, therefore, that the application for certification made herein by the 
Association is unfounded, and must be dismissed ; 
CONSIDERING, on the other hand, that the Amalgamated is an association of em-
ployées within the meaning of our law, and has complied with ail légal requirements for 
certification as bargaining agent for the employées hereinafter described: 
« Les employés de la production de la chaussure payés à l'heure et à la 
pièce » in the plant in issue. 
CONSIDERING that the application for certification filed by the Amalgamated herein 
is well founded, and must be granted. 
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, we do hereby: 
1) REJECT, for ail légal purposes, the application for certification filed herein by the 
Union des Employés de MacFarlane Lefaivre Mfg. Ltd. (Division Labelle), on the B t h of 
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November, 1962, to be certified as the bargaining agent for « tous les employés travaillant 
à la fabrication de la chaussure, à la main ou à la machine » in the employ of Boucher & 
Lefaivre Limited, at its plant at 1740 Papineau Street, Montreai ; 
2) RECOGNIZE the Union des Employés du Cuir de Montréal, Local L-102, Union 
des Tailleurs en Chaussures, Local 118 LF, locaux de l'Amalgamated Méat Cutters and 
Butchers Workmen of North America AFC CIO CTC, les deux locaux conjointement, as 
the bargaining agent of the following group of employées, namely: 
« les employés de la production de la chaussure payés à l'heure et à la 
pièce » 
in the employ of Boucher b Lefaivre Limited, at its plont at 1740 Papineau Street, Montréal,. 
Québec, and we do hereby issue in favour of the said Union des Employés du Cuir de 
Montréal, Local L-102, Union des Tailleurs en Chaussure, Local 118 LF, locaux de l'Annal-
gamated Méat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America AFL CIO CTC, les deux 
locaux conjointement, a certification of récognition in regard to the said group of employées ; 
The whole under the provisions of law provided. 
ARBITRAGE — Tâches — Reclassification à cause de nouvel 
équipement. 
Un tribunal majoritaire d'arbitre syndical étant dissident) décide qu'un 
employeur n'est pas tenu de créer une occupation nouvelle lorsqu'il fait 
l'acquisition de machines nouvelles qui n'entraînent pas de changement dans 
les éléments essentiels d'une tâche. 
Le simple fait d'inconvénients plus grands entourant l'utilisation de ces 
machines ne constitue pas une « occupation nouvelle » ou un « changement 
de tâche » au sens de la convention collective, mais justifie un taux de 
salaire plus élevé à ceux qui l'utilisent.1 
Au mois de décembre 1963, l'employeur a acheté une nouvelle machine à souder dite 
machine « innershield ». Il s'agit d'une machine qui emploie un filament continu pour fin 
de soudure, lequel filament se déroule de lui-même et d'une façon automatique aussi 
longtemps que l'employé appuie sur une « gâchette » faisant partie de la poignée servant 
à tenir et à contrôler la machine. 
Cette machine, utilisant un filament continu se déroulant au fur et à mesure de 
l'opération de soudure, est différente des machines à souder ordinaires, lesquelles utilisent 
des tiges (rods) de métal qu'il faut changer une fois chaque tige épuisée. Elle permet 
donc, entre autres caractéristiques, une opération plus rapide et impliquant moins de 
perte de matériel à souder. 
Les plaignants, tous des soudeurs classés « A », ont travaillé sur cette machine (la 
seule de son genre chez l'employeur) durant quelques mois, à tour de rôle, selon les besoins 
(1) Forano Limitée et le Syndicat catholique des employés de Fonderies de Plessisville 
Inc. ; Me Jean-Réal Cardin, président, M. Denis Germain, arbitre patronal, M. Raymond 
Parent, arbitre syndical (dissident); Québec 18 décembre 1964. 
